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A better solution may be to utilize a crop share lease,
rather than a cash rent lease.  Crop share leases meet the
qualified use test in the post-death period.24
FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 2032A.  See generally, 5 Harl, Agricultural Law
§43.03[2](1994); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
5.03[2](1994).
2 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(b)(1).
3 See I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(6)(A).
4 E.g., Williamson v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 242 (1989), aff'd,
974 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (cash rent lease to nephew
was cessation of qualified use).
5 E.g., Ltr. Rul. 8240015, June 29, 1982 (surviving spouse
did not have equity interest in land which was rented to
children under "net lease").
6 See n. 4 supra.
7 See n. 5 supra.
8 I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7)(A).
9 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C)(i).
10 See n. 2 supra.
11 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(5)(A).
12 Id.
13 Ltr. Rul. 9043044, July 31, 1990.
14 I.R.C. § 2056.
15 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1).
16 Ltr. Rul. 9043044, July 31, 1990.
17 Id.
18 I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(6)(A).
19 Ltr. Rul. 9022007, Feb. 27, 1990.
20 See n. 15 supra.
21 Ltr. Rul. 9022007, Feb. 27, 1990.
22 See 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 62.02[2] (1994).
23 Id., § 62.02[2][d][i].
24 E.g., Ltr. Rul. 8330016, April 26, 1983 (50-50 crop
share met qualified use test; lease was to member of
family as tenant so material participation requirement
met by tenant).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1994
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
394, (the Act) made several important changes to the
Bankruptcy Code. The Act expressly waives the
governmental immunity for money judgments against the
IRS for violation of the automatic stay and other provisions.
However, the Act limits the amount of attorney’s fees
recoverable to $75 per hour unless special expertise was
required and prohibits awards of punitive damages.
The Act also limits the actions which constitute a
violation of the automatic stay, excluding tax audits,
assessments, demands for tax returns and issuing of notices
and demands for payment of assessments.
The Act extends the period for governmental entities to
file claims after the first creditors’ meeting to 180 days but
expressly provides that late filed claims may be disallowed.
The Act increases the debt limit for Chapter 13
eligibility to $250,000 of unsecured debt and $750,000 of
secured debt.
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ATTORNEY’S FEES. The debtors filed for Chapter 11
and because they could not afford to give their bankruptcy
attorney a retainer, the attorney took a second mortgage on
the debtors’ farm. The fair market value of the farm was
sufficient to cover the other secured debt. The trustee
objected to the second mortgage as disqualifying the
attorney under Section 327(a). The court, sitting en banc,
held that the attorney’s second mortgage gave the attorney
an adverse interest in the estate sufficient to disqualify the
attorney. In re Escalera, 171 B.R. 107 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
1994).
CONSOLIDATION. The debtors, husband and wife,
owed a corporation which operated a horse breeding ranch.
The husband had made a personal guarantee of a
corporation loan to purchase a horse and had listed the farm
as the husband’s asset, even thought he farm was owned
solely by the wife. The court found that the creditor had not
relied on the farm in making the loan because no check was
made as to actual ownership and the farm was not taken as
security for the loan. The debtors filed a joint Chapter 11
petition, listing all of their assets on one schedule. The cases
were also jointly administered. The creditor sought to have
the cases declared substantively consolidated, subjecting the
wife’s farm to the husband’s guarantee, because the assets
of the debtors were commingled and the cases were jointly
administered. The appellate court reversed the order for
consolidation, holding that the joint administration of cases
was insufficient to make them consolidated and that the
wife’s assets and proceeds of assets were sufficiently
identifiable to be subject only to her debts. The court also
held that, because the creditor did not rely on the farm as
security for the loan and did not attempt to clarify
ownership of the farm before making the loan, the equities
favored not subjecting the wife’s farm to the husband’s
guarantee. In re Reider, 31 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1994).
SALES TAXES. The debtors were the owners of a
corporation which operated a pizza restaurant which owed
the state for sales taxes collected but not paid. The debtors
were personally liable for the corporation’s sales taxes. The
debtors argued that the sales taxes were a form of excise tax
dischargeable under Sections 523(a)(1)(A), 507(a)(7)(E).
The court held that because the debtors were personally
liable for the taxes, the sales taxes were a trust fund type of
tax under Section 507(a)(7)(C) and nondischargeable. In re
Kelley, 171 B.R. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
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PLAN . Two years before filing for Chapter 12, the
debtor borrowed money from a bank to construct two
poultry houses which were granted as collateral for the ten
year loan.  The debtor’s plan proposed to pay the remainder
of the loan over 15 years at 8.25 percent. The bank objected
to the plan, arguing that it did not make loans secured by
poultry houses for more than 10 years because the “life
expectancy” of poultry houses is about 10 years and that the
minimum interest rate would be the prime rate plus 2
percent. The court held that the plan could not be confirmed
with a payment term of more than 10 years at an interest
rate of at least the prime rate plus 2 percent, 9.25 percent at
the date of the petition. The plan also provided for partial
payment of another loan by transferring some of the land
securing the loan. The bank objected to this provision
because the land had no access to a public road. The debtor
agreed to include an access easement over the debtor’s land
as part of the plan. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption for the debtor’s deceased spouse as well and the
debtor’s own exemption, citing Ala. Code § 6-10-101. The
court held that the statute did not provide any additional
exemptions in bankruptcy and limited the debtor to one
exemption. Matter of Rice, 171 B.R. 401 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1994).
TRUSTEE’S FEES. The debtors’ plans (the opinion
involved several bankruptcy cases) provided for plan
payments directly to creditors with no payment of the
trustee’s fees on those payments. The  cases generally
involved three types of claims, secured claims for long term
debt, secured claims for short term debt, and income and
real estate tax claims. The court held that the secured long
term claims could be paid outside of the plan without
payment of trustee’s fees but the short term secured claims
must be paid through the trustee. The court also held that the
real estate taxes could be paid outside of the plan free of the
trustee’s fee because the taxes were secured by liens but that
the income taxes had to be paid through the trustee. The
court stated that this allocation allowed the trustee to receive
reasonable compensation in these cases but that in other
cases, the allocation could be different in order to provide
reasonable compensation for the trustee, tempered by the
debtors’ need to reorganize. In re Westpfahl, 171 B.R. 330
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor filed for Chapter 13
in February 1988 and the plan was confirmed in May 1988.
In August 1989, the IRS assessed the debtor for delinquent
1988 taxes and in May 1990 the IRS assessed the debtor for
delinquent 1989 taxes. In September 1990, the IRS filed tax
liens for the 1988 and 1989 taxes and in September 1991,
the IRS levied against amounts owed to the debtor by a
client. In April 1992, the debtor’s Chapter 13 case was
dismissed. The employees of the debtor sought to avoid the
IRS assessments and levies as violating the automatic stay.
The court held that the employees lacked standing to seek
avoidance of the assessments and levies but that even if the
employees had standing, the assessments and levies did not
violate the automatic stay because on confirmation of the
plan and dismissal of the case, the estate property reverted
to the debtor. Shell Oil Co. v. Capital Financial Services,
170 B.R. 903 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
The IRS had filed a pre-petition levy on the debtor's
wages which the IRS failed to lift upon the debtor's filing
for bankruptcy.  In addition, a second levy was made post-
petition after the IRS received notice of the bankruptcy
filing.  Although the IRS returned the funds received under
the second levy, the court held that the 90 day period taken
to return the funds was unreasonable and (1) allowed the
debtor 11 percent interest on the funds from the date of levy
until the date of the refund, (2) allowed the debtor 11
percent interest on funds levied under the pre-petition levy
but received post-petition, and (3) awarded $1,000 in
attorney's fees.  The District Court initially held that the
award of attorney's fees was improper because the award
was not based on a finding of actual fees incurred. On
remand, the fees were determined. On a second appeal, the
District Court, a different judge, held that the action was
barred by sovereign immunity which had not been waived in
the case.  Matter of Fernandez, 171 B.R. 135 (M.D. Fla.
1994), rev’g unrep. Bankr. Ct. dec. on remand from, 132
B.R. 775 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aff'g in part and rem'g, 125
B.R. 317 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
CLAIMS. The debtors filed for Chapter 7 and did not
include any federal income tax claims on the schedules. The
bar date for claims was in March 1992 but the IRS did not
indicate that the debtors owed any taxes until December
1993  and formally filed a claim in March 1994. The claim
included a priority tax claim and a general unsecured tax
claim for a prepetition tax year. At the time of the claim
filing, the trustee had not made any distributions, the case
was still open and the unsecured creditors were eligible to
receive only a t minimis return on their claims. The court
held that under the circumstances of the filing, the tax
claims would be allowed because no bad faith by the IRS
was shown in filing the claim late. In re Miller, 171 B.R.
163 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
The debtors owed federal taxes for 1989 and 1990 and
the IRS had filed a prepetition tax lien against the debtors’
property for the taxes. The taxes had accrued interest and
penalties to the extent that the total taxes, interest and
penalties exceeded the fair market value of the debtors’
property subject to the lien. The IRS allocated the collateral
to the claim starting with the taxes, interest and penalties
accrued for 1989 and then for 1990. The debtors argued that
the lien should be applied first to the taxes for both years,
then to the interest and penalties. The effect of the debtors’
allocation would be to make all of the penalties
dischargeable as unsecured claims. The court held that
United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545
(1990), did not apply to give the court the authority to
reallocate the collateral supporting the IRS claim; therefore,
the IRS allocation would be followed. In re Burgess, 171
B.R. 227 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtor was denied a discharge as to
federal taxes because the debtor transferred assets to a trust
controlled by the debtor when the debtor knew that the IRS
claimed a tax deficiency and would seek a lien against the
property.  The court held that an attempt to avoid attachment
of a lien through a fraudulent transfer was an attempt to
evade payment of taxes, preventing discharge of the tax
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debt.  In re Sumpter, 170 B.R. 908 (E.D. Mich. 1994),
aff’g, 136 B.R. 690 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991).
DISMISSAL . The debtor filed for Chapter 13 and
admitted not filing federal income tax returns for the last 28
years. The debtor filed the tax returns for the previous ten
years only after the urging of the Bankruptcy Court but did
not file a plan. The court held that the case would be
dismissed for bad faith filing. In re Morimoto, 171 B.R. 85
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994).
TAX LIENS. The debtors had granted a mortgage on
their home to secure a loan for the purchase of the home.
The mortgage was released by mistake in March 1986.
Before the error was discovered, the IRS filed tax liens on
the homestead. The Bankruptcy Court and District Court
allowed the reinstatement of the mortgage as of the date of
the error, giving the mortgagee a priority security interest in
the home, because the IRS did not rely on the release since
it did not know about the release until the debtors filed for
bankruptcy. The Appellate court reversed, holding that
I.R.C. § 6323 did not require IRS knowledge of the release
and did not allow any retroactive effect from the
reinstatement of the mortgage. In re Haas, 31 F.3d 1081
(11th Cir. 1994).
CONTRACTS
BOARS . The plaintiff purchased 21 boars from the
defendant over five written contracts. The plaintiff alleged
that the several of the boars were infected with atrophic
rhinitis and sued for damages. The defendant pled the
contracts which provided that damages for boars infected
with rhinitis was limited to the purchase price. The contracts
also contained a section which asked the buyer to include
any additional terms and the plaintiff had filled in “none.”
The plaintiff attempted to present evidence that the
defendant’s salesperson orally represented that the boars
were disease free. The damages limitation language was
printed on the front of the contracts and in bold or red. The
court held that the contract language was not ambiguous,
that the plaintiff was an experienced buyer of hogs and that
the parol evidence was not allowed to alter the terms of the
contracts.  The plaintiff also asserted that the oral
representations amounted to fraud, allowing the parol
evidence under the fraudulent misrepresentation exception.
The court held that because of the experience of the plaintiff
and the general knowledge that all livestock carry diseases,
the plaintiff’s reliance on the oral representations of a
salesperson that the boars were disease free was
unreasonable. Urschel Farms, Inc. v. Dekalb Swine
Breeders, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
CORPORATIONS
DISSOLUTION.  The debtor had formed an Iowa farm
corporation in the 1970’s to farm land in Iowa. In 1973, the
corporation sold its Iowa land and purchased land in Illinois
and registered to do business in Illinois as a farm
corporation. In 1977, the Iowa Secretary of State
involuntarily dissolved the corporation for failure to pay the
annual fee and file an annual report. The debtors did not
receive notice of the dissolution and continued to operate
the farm as a corporation. In 1981, the corporation sold
some of its land to an Illinois land trust and rented the land
from the trust. The proceeds of the sale were used to pay
operating expenses and debts. In 1982, the trustee seized the
corporation’s farm equipment and other assets to recover
damages and costs resulting from the corporation’s default
of the lease. The corporation transferred the land to the
trustee, sold all other remaining land, and ceased farming.
After the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
trustee sought recovery of the corporation’s assets, arguing
that the conveyances of the land were without effect because
the corporation was dissolved at the time of the
conveyances. The court applied Iowa law effective at the
time because the corporation was created by Iowa law and
Iowa corporation dissolution law did not contravene Illinois
law. The court held that after dissolution, a corporation has
authority to sell its assets for the purpose of winding up its
affairs. Although the initial transfer of the land to the land
trust was not for the purpose of winding up the corporation's
affairs and therefore was not within the corporation's
authority, the final transfers of land were made with the
intent to terminate the corporation’s business and were
authorized by Iowa law. In re Morris, 30 F.3d 1578 (7th
Cir. 1994), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g, 147 B.R. 930
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].* The
debtor defaulted on a loan with a Federal Land Bank and the
bank recalled the debtor’s FLB stock which the debtor was
required to purchase as a condition for the loan. The bank
informed the debtor about the debtor’s right to seek debt
restructuring but the debtor did not apply for debt
restructuring. The bank then instituted foreclosure
proceedings against the debtor’s farm property. The debtor
argued that, under the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act
(LDJA), La. Rev. Stat. § 13:4106, the bank was barred from
seeking any further recovery because the bank recalled the
stock in partial satisfaction of the debt. The court held that
the stock cancellation was made under federal law;
therefore, the LDJA did not apply and that the federal law
preempted the operation of the LDJA as to FLB loans. The
debtor also brought an action against the bank for violations
of the Agricultural Credit Act. The court held that the
Agricultural Credit Act does not provide a private right of
action to enforce the Act. Farm Credit Bank of Texas v.
Farish, 32 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1994).
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations increasing the indemnity for brucellosis reactor
and exposed cattle and bison destroyed during herd
depopulation or after being sold or traded from a herd
subsequently found to be infected with brucellosis. 59 Fed.
Reg. 52233 (Oct. 17, 1994).
DISASTER PAYMENTS. The FmHA has issued
interim final regulations establishing the Disaster Set Aside
program for FmHA borrowers who operated a farm or ranch
in a federally declared disaster area in 1993. Under the
program, a distressed borrower may move the next
scheduled loan payment to the end of the loan term. 59 Fed.
Reg. 53079 (Oct. 21, 1994).
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IMPORTS. The ASCS has issued proposed regulations
implementing an end-use certificate program for wheat and
barley imported from any foreign country which requires
end-use certificates of U.S.-produced wheat and barley. 59
Fed. Reg. 52931 (Oct. 20, 1994).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION. The AMS
has issued proposed regulations updating the voluntary
poultry grade standards as to discoloration, exposed flesh,
and the procurement grades. 59 Fed. Reg. 52469 (Oct. 18,
1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent had established a revocable inter
vivos trust which provided that, upon the death of the
decedent, the trust assets passed to another trust for the
decedent’s grandniece and grandnephew for life with the
remainder to pass to a charitable organization. The
beneficiaries received an annuity but the life expectancy of
the beneficiaries made the possibility of any amount passing
to the charitable organization remote such that no estate tax
charitable deduction would be allowed. The IRS ruled that
the trust qualified as a charitable remainder trust even
though the charitable organization had less than a 5 percent
chance of receiving any trust property. The IRS also ruled
that the charitable organization was not a “skip person” and
that the transfer to the trust was not subject to GSTT
because the transfer was already subject to estate tax. Ltr.
Rul. 9440010, July 5, 1994.
In 1982, the decedent’s will bequeathed property to two
trusts. Each trust had the surviving spouse and one of the
decedent’s sons and his issue as beneficiaries. The trustee of
each trust had the power to distribute net income to the
beneficiaries and to distribute trust principal for “special
needs or emergencies.” The trustee petitioned a state court
for the authority to distribute trust property to minor
beneficiaries through a custodian appointed under the
Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. The IRS ruled
that the trustee’s authority to make distributions to a
VUTMA custodian for minor beneficiaries would not
subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9440011, July 5, 1994.
The decedent’s will included an exercise of a power of
appointment over trust assets in a trust created by the
decedent’s father in 1945. The decedent’s will appointed the
property to trusts for the decedent’s children. The trustee of
one of the children’s trust exercised a power to invade
principal to transfer trust property to a new identical trust
but with the provision that the trust terminated as to the
assets from the decedent’s father before 21 years after the
death of the last descendant of the decedent in being at the
death of the decedent’s father. The IRS ruled that the
transfer of the trust property to the new trust would not
subject the trust to GSTT as to the assets passing from the
decedent’s father under the power of appointment to the
new trust. Ltr. Rul. 9440015, July 6, 1994.
The decedent’s will passed property to a trust which
consisted of a marital share and a residuary share. The
surviving  spouse disclaimed a fractional share of the
marital trust and the estate elected to treat the remaining
marital share trust as QTIP. The estate also made the reverse
QTIP election of I.R.C.§ 2652 giving the marital trust a zero
inclusion ratio. The surviving spouse transferred the income
interest and remainder interest in the marital share trust to a
trust for the spouse’s children and filed a gift tax return. The
IRS ruled that the marital trust assets that passed to the
spouse’s children would also have a zero inclusion ration for
GSST purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9440018, July 7, 1994.
In 1981, an irrevocable trust was created for the
grantor’s daughter with a remainder for the daughter’s
children. The daughter created a second trust for the
daughter's child, funded with property which would have a
zero inclusion amount after allocation of the GSTT
exemption. The trust was to terminate within the period
allowed by the state rule against perpetuities.  The daughter
then formed a limited partnership and contributed the assets
of the original trust in exchange for a .99 percent general
partnership interest and a 98.02 percent limited partnership
interest. The new trust was also contributed to the
partnership in exchange for a .99 percent general partnership
interest. Both trusts received partnership interests
corresponding to the value of assets contributed to the
partnership. The IRS ruled that the contribution of the
original trust assets to the partnership would not subject the
trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9440023, July 8, 1994.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1].* The decedent’s estate originally filed an
estate tax return claiming no tax due. After an audit the IRS
sent a notice of tax deficiency to the wrong address but the
estate received the notice with 34 days remaining to make
an election to pay the deficiency in installments. The
election was filed 10 days late to the wrong IRS service
center and the election included a check for the first
installment of taxes but not the interest due.  The estate
argued that the election should have been allowed because
of the delay in receipt and unavoidable delays caused by the
estate’s attorney. The court held that the denial of the
election was proper because the estate had sufficient time to
make the election and the election was not only late but was
improperly filed and did not include the required payment.
Bauersfeld v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,182
(D. Kan. 1994).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will provided for the surviving spouse to receive
the decedent’s personal property, the decedent’s daughters
to receive $600,000 and the surviving spouse to receive all
remaining property. The estate was liable for Ohio estate tax
of $153,738. The IRS allocated the state tax against the
residuary bequest to the spouse, making the tax amount not
eligible for the marital deduction and the estate liable for
$55,000 in federal estate taxes. Under Ohio Rev. Code §
2113.86(B), the state estate tax could not be allocated to
specific bequests; therefore, the allocation of the estate taxes
to the residuary clause was proper and decreased the
property eligible for the marital deduction. Est. of Ferrara
v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,181 (N.D. Ohio
1994).
The decedent’s estate included assets in excess of $102
million and secured debts in excess of $37 million. The
decedent’s surviving spouse petitioned the state probate
court to take the surviving spouse’s elective one-third share
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of the estate. The estate argued that the elective share was
not liable for the secured debt under Tennessee law;
therefore, the marital deduction would equal one-third of the
estate’s assets without first reducing the estate by the
amount of secured debt. The court held that Tennessee law
was changed to remove the elective share exemption from
liability for an estate’s secured debt; therefore, the surviving
spouse’s elective share had to be reduced by one-third of the
secured debt. Est. of Williams v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. No.
25 (1994).
The decedent’s will provided for specific bequests to the
surviving spouse and children, employees, charities and
others. The residuary estate passed to a charitable
organization. The surviving spouse filed an election within
nine months after the decedent’s death to take a partial
statutory share from the residuary estate and renounced any
right to an elective share from any of the specific bequests.
The IRS ruled that the property passing under the partial
statutory  share would be considered as passing from the
decedent  to the surviving spouse and eligible for the marital
deduction. The IRS also ruled that the renunciation of the
statutory share as to the specific bequests would be an
effective disclaimer. Ltr. Rul. 9440027, July 11, 1994.
VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[3][a].* The taxpayer
transferred stock to a trust which provided for a percentage
annuity payment to the taxpayer plus an amount equal to the
federal income tax liability incurred by the taxpayer from
the trust. The IRS ruled that the transfer of the stock to the
trust did not cause recognition of any gain or loss and that
the taxpayer’s interest in the trust was a qualified interest
under I.R.C. § 2702(b). Ltr. Rul. 9441031, July 12, 1994.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, jointly owned two
vacation homes on adjoining lots. The taxpayer divided the
realty such that each taxpayer owned one residence. Each
residence was transferred to a ten-year trust with the owner
as the sole beneficiary. The trusts provided that if the
property was sold or destroyed, the trusts became annuity
trusts for the beneficiary. The beneficiary had the right of
first refusal on any sale of the trust property. The IRS ruled
that the trusts were qualified personal interest trusts for
purposes of I.R.C. § 2702. Ltr. Rul. 9441039, July 15,
1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS-ALM § 4.03[7].* The taxpayer was the
sole shareholder and president of a corporation which was
terminated. The taxpayer personally paid a settlement to the
corporation’s former employees after the state department of
labor brought suit on behalf of the employees. The taxpayer
was allowed only a nonbusiness bad debt deduction for the
settlement payment because the corporation and not the
taxpayer was considered to be the entity in the trade or
business which employed the employees. Ludwig v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-518.
COOPERATIVES. A cooperative amended its bylaws
to provide for calculation of an Alternative Minimum Tax
Income (AMTI) patronage dividend for its members in
order to obtain a full deduction for such payments for AMT
purposes. The IRS ruled that the amendment complied with
the requirements for an AMT patronage dividend deduction
from AMT and that the AMT and regular patronage
dividend deductions were to be reported on separate
schedules with the two sets of figures combined on one
Form 4626 to which the schedules should be attached. Ltr.
Rul. 9440002, June 21, 1994.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer received a settlement of a Title VII
racial discrimination suit against the U.S. Commerce
Department and claimed a portion of the settlement as
excludible from income as character damage. The court held
that under U.S. v. Burke, 112 S.Ct. 1867 (1992), awards and
settlement payments under Title VII actions are included in
taxable income. United States v. Stubblefield, 94-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,515 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
EXPENSES.  The estimated deductible costs for use in
adjusting farm expenses to exclude the cost of producing
home-consumed farm produce on 1994 income tax returns
as issued by the Iowa State University Extension Service are
as follows--
Pork $33.75 per 100 lbs. liveweight
Beef $43.85 per 100 lbs. liveweight
Lamb $41.40 per 100 lbs. liveweight
Broilers $1.45 per 4 pound bird
Eggs $0.58 per dozen
Milk $8.05 per 100 lbs. or $0.69 per gallon
The above costs include all cash costs, depreciation and
deductible production costs of home-raised feed.  No charge
is made for the farm operator's labor.  If hired labor or
purchased grain and roughages are used to produce these
products, or if high interest costs are incurred, the costs
should be increased accordingly.  In arriving at production
costs, it was assumed that the young animals were raised
and fed.  FM 1421, Iowa State University, October 1994.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
taxpayer corporation sold some land on a two year
installment contract but the taxpayer’s tax department
mistakenly believed the transaction involved only one
payment and did not elect the installment method of
reporting the gain from the sale. The taxpayer represented
that the revocation of the election out of the installment
method would not decrease the taxpayer’s aggregate tax
liability. The IRS ruled that the revocation of the election
would be allowed. Ltr. Rul. 9441010, July 6, 1994.
LEVY.  The IRS has adopted as final regulations
increasing the amount of some exemptions and adding
property to the list of exemptions from levy as required by
TAMRA 1988. 59 Fed. Reg. 53087 (Oct. 21, 1994).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
TERMINATION. A 50 percent partner transferred a 49
percent partnership interest to an affiliate. At least one year
and one day later, the partner transferred the other 1 percent.
The IRS ruled that neither transfer caused the termination of
the partnership for federal tax purposes because 50 percent
of the partnership was not transferred within a 12 month
period. Ltr. Rul. 9440017, July 17, 1994.
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RETURNS. The IRS has reissued the conditions under
which a case closed after an examination may be reopened
to make an adjustment unfavorable to the taxpayer. The
revenue procedure also provides a nonexclusive list of
contacts by the IRS with the taxpayer which are not
considered an examination, inspection, or reopening of an
examination and a list of types of cases in which
reconsideration is not considered a reopening of the case.
Rev. Proc. 94-68, I.R.B. 1994-44.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
November 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.34 6.24 6.19 6.16
110% AFR 6.90 6.86 6.80 6.76
120% AFR 7.63 7.49 7.42 7.38
Mid-term
AFR 7.45 7.32 7.25 7.21
110% AFR 8.21 8.05 7.97 7.92
120% AFR 8.97 8.78 8.69 8.62
Long-term
AFR 8.01 7.86 7.78 7.73
110% AFR 8.84 8.65 8.56 8.50
120% AFR 9.65 9.43 9.32 9.25
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX-ALM § 4.06.*  Beginning
with the January 3, 1995 payment, the monthly social
security benefit payments will increase 2.8 percent to a
maximum of $458 for an individual and $687 for a couple.
The maximum amount of annual wages subject to Old Age
Survivors and Disability Insurance for 1995 is $61,200, with
all wages and self-employment income subject to the
medicare portion of the tax.  The maximum amount of
annual earnings before reduction of benefits is $11,280 for
persons aged 65 through 69 and $8,160 for persons under
age 65. The amount of wages necessary for one quarter of
coverage is $630.  HHS News Release, October 14, 1994.
The independent government agency, the Social Security
Administration, was created by Pub. L. No. 103-296, 108
Stat. 1464 (1994).
TRADE OR BUSINESS. The taxpayer formed a
corporation to conduct stock trading using the proceeds of a
sale of another corporation. The new corporation hired
independent money managers who were instructed to trade
stock owned by the corporation for the purpose of obtaining
the maximum capital return. Thus, most of the stock trades
were for long-term holding of stock. The taxpayer’s duties
involved managing the corporation but the taxpayer did not
participate in any trades nor did the taxpayer meet with the
money managers to discuss any trades. The court held that
the taxpayer’s activity with the corporation did not
constitute a trade or business because the taxpayer did not
personally participate in the stock trading, the stock trading
did not occur often enough, the taxpayer did not actively
participate in the money’s manager’s trading of the stock
and the management of the money managers by the
corporation did not qualify as a trade of business of the
taxpayer. Mayer v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,509 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was denied
deductions for travel expenses incurred while traveling
between two jobs because the taxpayer did not maintain
records showing the amount, time, place and business
purpose of the travel. Guice v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1994-521.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was a self-employed consulting
engineer who formed a trust to hold the taxpayer’s personal
and business assets. The court held that the trust income
from the taxpayer’s business was the taxpayer’s personal
income subject to self-employment tax because the trust was
a sham since the taxpayer treated the trust assets as the
taxpayer’s own and did not consult with the trustee before
buying, selling or giving away trust property. Spencer v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-531.
MORTGAGES
GROWING CROPS. The debtors had granted a
mortgage on their farm to the Wyoming Farm Loan Board
(the Board). The debtors filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy but
the Board was allowed relief from the automatic stay to
foreclose against the property. The property included winter
wheat which would mature in three months after the
foreclosure sale and three irrigation systems owned by the
debtors. The court held that the crops were part of the real
estate and title to the crops passed with the real estate on the
foreclosure sale. The creditor purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale and the debtors sought rent for use of the
irrigation systems. The court held that the Board was a
government entity which had not waived its sovereign
immunity from suits for money damages. Haldeman v.
State of Wyoming Farm Loan Board, 32 F.3d 469 (10th
Cir. 1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONTINUATION. In February 1984, the debtors gave
a creditor a mortgage on farm real estate. Under S.D. Code
§ 44-8-26, the mortgage was valid for five years and 60
days  unless an addendum was filed before the end of that
period (April 1989). The creditor failed to file an addendum
within that period and the debtor claimed that the mortgage
lapsed and the loan became unsecured. The debtor had filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 1985 and the case was
closed in February 1986. The creditor argued that the
automatic stay of the bankruptcy tolled the five year and 60
day period during the case, under Section 108(c), allowing
the lapse date to extend to May 1990, after the addendum
was filed. The court held that Section 108(c) did not apply
because the creditor had ample time to file the addendum
within the three years after the close of the Chapter 11 case;
therefore, the mortgage lapsed  five years and 60 days after
filing. In re Roth, 171 B.R. 357 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1994).
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STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
MILK. The Maine Dairy Farm Stabilization Act, Me.
Rev. Stat. tit. 36, §§ 4541-4547, imposed a tax on all
packaged fluid milk sold in Maine irrespective of the origin
of the milk but provided a rebate only to Maine dairy
producers. A company which sold out of state milk in
Maine sued, arguing that the tax and rebate program
violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Citing West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S.Ct. 2205
(1994), the appellate court reversed a holding for the state
and ruled that the tax and rebate program violated the
Commerce Clause. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. LaFaver,
33 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994), rev’g and rem’g, 834 F. Supp.
27 (D. Me. 1993)..
CITATION UPDATES
Downey v. Comm’r, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994),
rev’g, 100 T.C. 634 (1993) (court awards and settlements)
see p. 149 supra.
Horton v. Comm’r, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994), aff’g,
100 T.C. 93 (1993)(court awards and settlements) see p.
149 supra.
Kisling v. Comm’r, 32 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1994)
(transfers within three years of death) see p. 141 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1995.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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